Introduction
Local governments play a k ey role in the institutional setting in the United States. Local governments are responsible for providing a variety of services including education and public safety. These rank among the most important services provided by g o v ernments at any level in the U.S. These also are surely two of the most important factors in uencing household location in metropolitan areas. Analysis of public good provision is increasingly based on models that characterize self-selection of households into municipalities and collective c hoice via majority rule within municipalities. These models typically presume that tax-expenditure policies within jurisdictions are based on majority rule. 1 Yet this entire framework has not been subject to rigorous empirical analysis in an equilibrium setting.
Additionally, there are only a few empirical studies which analyze whether observed local expenditures for public goods are consistent with majority rule. 2 The goal of this paper is to investigate whether levels of local public good provision observed within a system of jurisdictions satisfy the restrictions implied by majority rule and rational voting in a general equilibrium model of residential choice.
Testing the hypothesis of majority rule in a system of local jurisdictions is not a straightforward exercise for at least three reasons. First, preferences for local public goods are unobserved and vary among households. We only observe expenditure levels which are 1 See, for example, Epple, Filimon, and Romer 1984 , Goodspeed 1989 , Epple and Romer 1991 , Nechyba 1997b and Fernandez and Rogerson 1996 An important exception is the seminal work of Romer and Rosenthal 1979 , and Romer, Rosenthal, and Munley 1992 who analyze spending and voting in school budget referenda. Inman 1978 was the rst to propose and implement a test of the hypothesis that allocations are determined by the voter with median income.
outcomes of collective c hoices and already re ect the aggregation of household preferences.
Second, majority rule implies that the level of public good provision depends on the tastes and endowments of all residents within a community. H o w ever, households are mobile and choose among a number of di erent communities within a metropolitan area when making residential decisions. Mobility therefore implies that the composition of the population of a community and hence the decisive v oters within a community are jointly determined in equilibrium. Households will therefore sort themselves in equilibrium according to tastes and endowments. Households with similar unobserved preferences will reside in the same community as rst suggested by Tiebout 1956 . This process causes some severe econometric problems for any empirical analysis. It implies that a sample drawn from any community is not a random sample of the underlying population due to this self-selection process. Estimation procedures that ignore this problem are likely to be inconsistent, a problem that is also referred to as the Tiebout Bias" problem in public economics Goldstein and Pauly, 1981 . Finally, observed characteristics of communities like housing prices and expenditure levels are potentially correlated with unobserved characteristics giving rise to endogeneity problems in estimation. This problem is closely related to the endogeneity problems encountered in demand and supply models with di erentiated products Berry, 1994. In a previous study, Epple and Sieg 1999 develop a new framework to study spatial sorting processes in equilibrium models of local jurisdictions. While the approach taken in that paper provides a rigorous test of the underlying framework and allows us to estimate most parameters of interest, it does not exploit restrictions implied by collective c hoices determined by majority rule. Hence it does not allow researchers to investigate whether public expenditures can be rationalized by majority rule. This paper shows how to test this hypothesis by pursuing a di erent approach for identi cation and estimation.
We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice in which expenditure levels and property tax rates of local jurisdictions are chosen by majority rule. Under reasonable restrictions about the admissible set of preferences, the model yields strong predictions about the distribution of households by income within and across jurisdictions. These distributions can be matched with empirical income distributions observed in a sample of communities. The key insight of this paper is that matching income distributions allows us to characterize boundary indi erence loci of adjacent communities, as well as loci of pivotal voters within each community in equilibrium. Under additional assumptions on voting behavior and housing markets, we can then investigate whether the levels of public good provision implied by the loci characterizing decisive v oters under majority rule explain observed expenditure levels in our sample.
The estimator proposed in this paper controls for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households, observed and unobserved characteristics of communities, the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures and the self-selection of households into communities of their choice. We estimate the structural parameters of the model using data of the Boston Metropolitan Area. The empirical ndings are by and large encouraging for our approach. The paper thus provides a comprehensive empirical investigation of majority rule within a model of a system of local jurisdictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information about the data set and discusses property tax legislation in Massachusetts that is relevant for our study. Section 3 presents the general equilibrium model on which our analysis is based and derives optimality conditions that public expenditures must satisfy if they are determined by majority rule. We then introduce a parameterization of the model and show how to approximate the slope of the government service possibility frontier under di erent assumptions on voter sophistication. The estimation strategy is derived in Section 4. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 presents the conclusions of the analysis.
The Data Set
The data set used in this paper includes the communities that constitute the Boston Metropolitan Area. Massachusetts is interesting to study because cities and school districts are coterminous. 3 Hence a single tax rate applies within a community's boundary.
We therefore avoid problems which m a y arise due to overlapping jurisdictions. 4 Property taxes are also the primary source of local revenues in Massachusetts which a v oids the need of modeling other revenue sources.
Our data set is from the 1980 US Census. This time period predates a law restricting 3 This important property of Massachusetts municipalities and school districts was rst emphasized by Brueckner 1982 , who proposed and implemented a strategy for testing public sector e ciency by exploiting implications of property v alue maximization. 4 Nechyba 1997a, 1997b analyzes residential decisions in a framework with both local and state governments.
property taxation in Massachusetts which i s t ypically referred to as Proposition 2 1 2 . This law w as passed in 1981 in Massachusetts and limited property tax rates to two and a half percent after some adjustment period. Since many jurisdictions had property taxes in the period leading up to 1981 which w ere higher than the limits set in Proposition 2 1 2 , i t imposed for all practical purposes a binding constraint on these communities. We model the political process within each community as unconstrained choices determined by majority rule. We w ould need to modify the framework to accommodate constraints on tax rates if we w ere to use data from the 1990 Census. Binding constraints on the community level also lead to less variation in the level of public good provision on the local level which causes multicollinearity problems in empirical work. For these reasons, it is preferable to base our empirical examination on data for the period prior to passage of Proposition 2 1 2 . Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of the most important v ariables in the sample. The sample size is 92 which equals the number of cities and townships in the Boston Metropolitan Area. These communities di er substantially along many dimensions of interest. The city of Boston is, as expected, the largest community in the sample with a population of approximately 563,000 inhabitants. The smallest community, B o xborough, has only 3,126 inhabitants. Median household income ranges from $11,201 in Chelsea to $47,646 in Weston. Mean income is, as expected, signi cantly higher than median income indicating a skewed income distribution. There is a strong negative correlation between community size and median income level. If we rank communities according to income, most of the larger communities are at the bottom of that ranking. The only exception is Newton which has a relatively high median income and places in the upper third of the size ranking. Di erences in income are also re ected in property v alues which range from $35,600 in Chelsea to $143,500 in Weston. Similar di erences although less pronounced are found for the median gross rent.
For our empirical investigation, we need the annual implicit rent per unit of housing services in each community. These implicit prices are unobserved but can be imputed from observed rental expenditures and housing values. The U.S. Census also reports the joint distribution of incomes and housing values within each community. F ollowing Poterba 1992 we convert housing values into imputed rents. We then t a simple demand model implied by our speci cation of the indirect utility to the aggregate Engle curves. This allows us to estimate housing prices for each community. The basic idea behind this procedure is that housing prices are proportional to imputed rents once one controls for the income e ect.
The point estimates for these housing prices are of reasonable magnitude and indicate that there is a signi cant amount of heterogeneity in housing markets among communities. 5 In empirical analysis we focus on education expenditures per household, which range from $702 to $2,724. There is a strong positive correlation between this measure and both income and housing values. Other amenities which m a y h a v e an in uence on residential choices include the crime levels which range from 134.6 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants down to 42.13. Smaller communities have t ypically lower crime rates than larger ones. Crime is also negatively correlated with income as one may expect. The main source of revenue for these communities is property taxation. E ective property taxes which adjust for di erent de nitions of the tax base range from 1.3 percent to 6.5 percent. Taxes are negatively correlated with income indicating that poorer communities with smaller tax bases choose higher tax rates to nance public good provision.
The large number of communities and di erences in size and other attributes discussed above make the Boston Metropolitan Area in 1980 an ideal candidate for studying public good provision, collective and individual choices. The empirical analysis of Tiebout sorting and majority rule is di cult without specifying an analytical framework which suggests the identifying restrictions for estimation Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts, 1987. 6 Our empirical strategy therefore involves the following steps: First, we specify an equilibrium model and derive some properties of equilibrium allocations. We then introduce a parameterization of the model, and develop a strategy to identify and estimate the structural 5 A detailed discussion of how to construct housing price estimates from the available data can be found in Epple and Sieg 1999. 6 See also Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro 1982. parameters of the model. We implement the empirical approach using the data discussed above. Finally, w e i n v estigate whether the parameter estimates and the empirical results are supportive of majority rule and Tiebout sorting.
3 The Theoretical Framework
A General Equilibrium Model of Residential Choices
The economy consists of a continuum of households, C, living in a metropolitan area. The homogeneous land in the metropolitan area is divided among J communities, each of which has xed boundaries. Jurisdictions may di er in the amount of land contained within their boundaries. We also assume that households behave as price takers. A household living in community j has preferences de ned over a local public good, g, a local housing good, h, and a composite private good, b. Denote with p the relative gross-of-tax price of a unit of housing services in community j, p h the net-of-tax price, and let y be the household's endowment of the composite private good. Households pay taxes that are levied on the consumption of housing services. Let t be an ad valorem tax on housing in community j.
Individuals di er in their endowed income, y, and in a taste parameter, , which re ects the household's valuation of the public good. The continuum of households, C, is implicitly described by the joint distribution of y and . We assume that this distribution has a continuous density, f ; y, with respect to Lebesgue Measure. We refer to a household with taste parameter, , and income, y, a s ; y. Here we a n ticipate a simpli cation adopted in our empirical analysis. Preferences are assumed separable in g and h,b so that housing demand does not depend on g. of community, j, m ust be balanced. 8 This implies that:
where cg is the per capita cost for providing g and
is the size of community j.
Voters in every community decide about the level of provision of the public good, g, and the tax level, t. Mobility among communities is costless and in equilibrium every household lives in his or her preferred community. T o close the model we assume that the there is housing supply function , H s p h , in each community. 9 Having speci ed all components of a generic equilibrium model, we de ne an intercommunity equilibrium as follows:
De nition 1 An intercommunity equilibrium consists of a set of communities, f1; :::; Jg, a c ontinuum of households, C, a distribution, P, of household characteristics and y, a n d a p artition of C across communities fC 1 ; :::; C J g, such that every community has a p ositive population, i.e. 0 P C j 1 , a v e ctor of prices and taxes, p 1 ; t 1 ; :::; p J ; t J , a n 8 W e impose this assumption for simplicity to close the model. The analysis can be easily extended to incorporate lump sum transfers, for example, from the state government to the local governments. The estimator developed in Section 4 exploits rst order conditions implied by optimal household demands for public goods which are una ected by lump sum transfers. allocation of public goods, g 1 ; :::; g J , and an allocation, h ; b , for every household ; y, 3. The level of provision of the public good, g j , and the property tax rate, t j , i n c ommunity j are determined by majority rule in each community j.
4. The budget of every community is balanced:
If household preferences satisfy single-crossing properties, the existence of an intercommunity equilibrium has been shown in somewhat simpler versions of this model. e.g. models without taste variation. Equilibria have also been computed for parameterizations of models with taste heterogeneity, similar to the one used in this paper. We assume that an equilibrium exists and we test necessary conditions for an allocation to be an equilibrium.
Necessary conditions for equilibrium in this model impose a number of restrictions on the equilibrium allocation which apply quite broadly.
Consider an equilibrium allocation in which n o t w o communities have the same housing prices and assume that preferences satisfy the single-crossing properties. For such a n allocation to be a locational equilibrium no-one wishes to move there must be an ordering of community pairs, fg 1 ; p 1 ; :::; g J ; p J g , such that a households on the boundary are indi erent b e t w een two adjacent communities, b the distribution of households across communities exhibit strati cation by income and tastes, and c the levels of public good provision and housing prices are both monotonic functions of the rank of the community Epple and Platt, 1998 . Consequently, equilibrium allocation exhibit incomplete income strati cation of households across communities. Communities can be ranked according the desirability of their amenities. Higher amenity communities must have higher housing prices to prevent other households from moving into these communities. Conditions a, b and c must hold in equilibrium, regardless of the collective c hoice mechanism that determines public good levels and tax rates within communities.
Following most previous positive studies in the literature, we assume that the pair t; g in each community i s c hosen by majority rule. In each community, v oters take the t; g pairs in all other communities as given when making their decisions. One can make a v ariety of assumptions about voter sophistication regarding anticipation of the way c hanges in the community's own t; g pair a ect their community housing prices and migration into or out of the community. F or example, voters might take the net-of-tax price and community tax base as given and then deduce from the budget constraint the link between gross-of-tax price and expenditures on local public goods. This is the simplest and most commonly adopted approach Epple et al., 1984. 11 Alternatively, v oters in a community might take the t; g pairs in other communities as given and then predict how c hanges in their community's tax and expenditure policy will a ect the price of housing in their community. 12 The community budget constraint, housing market clearing, and perceived migration effects de ne a locus of g;p pairs that determine the government-services possibility frontier GPF. For given tax and expenditure policies in other communities, a point on the GPF that cannot be beaten in a majority v ote is a majority equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates a possible relationship between housing prices and government services in a community. I n this example, the GPF is increasing over a range of low and medium tax levels. Higher This gure illustrates the shape of the GPF for the rst community in a simple two community model. taxes yield higher revenues and therefore higher levels of public good provision. However, at some level of taxation the reduction in revenue due to the shrinking of the tax base caused by outward migration o sets the e ect caused by the increased tax rates. At that point the GPF slopes backward and the tax revenues decrease as the tax rates increase.
More formally, the set border individuals between communities j and j + 1 is charac-terized by the following expression: I j = f ; y j V ; g j ; p j ; y = V ; g j+1 ; p j +1 ; y g 3.8
Let y j be the implicit function de ned by equation 3.8. Consider a point g j ; p j o n community j's GPF, and letỹ j de ne a set of voters who weakly prefer g j ; p j t o a n y other g j ; p j on the GPF. Then g j ; p j is a majority v oting equilibrium for the given GPF where j and j are, respectively, the lowest and highest values of in the community.
Note thatỹ j de nes a locus of pivotal voters. 13 Thus far we h a v e assumed that there is a single public good in the economy. Empirical implementation leads to consideration of multiple local goods and amenities. Households typically not only care about expenditures on local public goods, but also other amenities like proximity to parks and other areas of recreation. Following the literature on di erentiated products, it is useful to measure total public good provision by an index that depends on both local expenditures on public goods and other amenities of the community. Let gx 1 ; :::; x n denote this index. Some amenities e.g., proximity t o a c e n tral business district, proximity to a beach may be exogenously determined by the physical location of the 13 A formal proof of a similar result is in Epple and Platt 1998 and the same argument applies in this model. community. Others may be endogenous determined by collective c hoices in equilibrium.
Let the function g be common to all voters, as we assume in our empirical analysis.
Suppose k of the elements of g are chosen by majority rule. The voting result above then extends immediately when g j is replaced by x 1;j ; x 2 ;j ; :::; x k;j . This speci cation also implies that the same locus of votersỹ j is pivotal for every locally chosen public good.
The assumption that the function g is common to all voters circumvents the problems of existence of equilibrium that are endemic to models where voting is over multi-dimensional alternatives. Intuitively speaking, the index assumption allows us to split the collective choice problem in two components: the preferred level of the index and its optimal composition. The index function is the same for all voters and therefore there is no disagreement about the optimal composition of public goods given the index level. Since we are interested in empirical implementation, further development of the model is best done in a parameterized context.
A P arameterization of the Model
Let the joint distribution of ln and lny be bivariate normal. The boundary indi erence conditions in equation 3.12 imply a set of non-intersecting downward-sloping boundary loci in the lny; ln plane. These loci have i n tercepts K j on the ln axis, and we refer to these as community-speci c intercepts Figure 2 . The population living in community j can be obtained by i n tegrating between the lines that go through K j,1 and K j . Consequently the population in community j is given by: 3.18
For a given point on the GPF, the expression in equation 3.17 partitions every community i n to two groups. The set of voters preferring lower government services can be obtained by i n tegrating the joint distribution of ln ; lny between the line given by K j,1 and the line given by L j . Substituting equations 3.17 and 3.18 into equation 3.9 implies that the locus of pivotal voters is given by: where A j is the xed amount of land area in community j and M j is a mobile factor used in production. Assume that p m is the same in all communities. 
The Slope of the GPF
In order to characterize pivotal voters in a community, w e need to derive an expression for the slope of the GPF. Recall, the GPF is de ned as the locus of g j ; p j such that housing markets have to be in equilibrium:
F j g j ; p j ; t j = H d j g j ; p j ; t j ,H s j p j ; t j = 0 3.24 and the community budget is balanced:
G j g j ; p j ; t j = c g j ,p j t j 1 + t j H d j g j ; p j ; t j = 0 3.25
given the perceived migration e ects. Totally di erentiating both equations above and solving for dp j =dg j yields: dp j dg j GPF = The right hand side of the expression above does not have a simple closed form solution in general. However, there are two cases which h a v e gained special attention in the theoretical literature which yield tractable approximations of this derivative.
The rst case is typically referred to as the myopic voting model. According to this hypothesis, voters in each community ignore all e ects of migration, i.e. voters treat the boundaries of the communities as xed. In addition each v oter takes the net-of-tax price of housing, community population, and the housing quantities as xed. This is the simple myopic voting model: dp j dg j GPF = c 0 g j H j
3.27
The main advantage of the myopic voting model is that the slope of the GPF is basically only a function of two v ariables: the marginal costs of providing the public good and the per capita housing demand. This formulation is implicit in all prior empirical work estimating demand functions for local public goods and traces to the pioneering work by Barr and Davis 1966 and Goodman 1973 . As we will see in the next section, this simpli es the task of estimating the parameters of the model considerably.
The second case draws on modern club theory and assumes that individuals are utility takers. 14 In our context, let voters in community j take public goods and housing prices elsewhere as given. Then utility attainable in all other communities is given. For individual ; y that is:
V ; y = max i6 =j V ; p i ; g i ; y
3.28
Proposition 1 in Epple and Sieg 1999 implies that the allocation of households across communities will satisfy boundary indi erence, strati cation and ascending bundles. The utility-taking assumption implies that voters in community j anticipate the change in K j and K j,1 that results from a change in p j and g j , taking the p; g in all other communities and hence in the adjacent communities as given. Under this assumption, we can then derived a closed-form solution for the slope of the GPF. However, the functional form of this slope is much more complex. In particular, the slope of the GPF will not only depend on the two variables above, but also on prices and public good provision in adjacent communities. 15 Summarizing the section, we h a v e i n troduced a spatial equilibrium model which provides the basis for the empirical analysis of this paper. We h a v e de ned equilibrium for this model and derived a number of properties which c haracterize the allocation of households across communities and the determination of tax rates and expenditure levels under majority rule.
14 The theory of clubs was initiated by Buchanan 1965 . See also Ellickson 1973 , 1979 , Scotchmer and Wooders 1987 , Gilles and Scotchmer 1997 and Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer, and Zame 1999 Notes specifying the deviation of the slopes of the GPF in both cases are available from the authors. The derivation entails di erentiating 3.24 and 3.25 using 3.12, 3.14, 3.21 and 3.22 to obtain the derivative in 3.26. This is straightforward, but tedious.
We h a v e shown how t o i n troduce multiple public goods and amenities into the analysis without losing the tractability of the model. We h a v e i n troduced a parameterization of the model that allows us to characterize the distribution of households across communities and the income distribution within each community in a computationally tractable way.
These income distributions are characterized by quantiles, which are di erentiable functions of the underlying parameters of the model. We h a v e also shown that a majority v oting equilibrium implies a locus of pivotal voters in each community. The preferred level of public good provision depends on the assumptions one is willing to impose on the degree of sophistication of the voters. The next section discusses how to identify and estimate the parameters of the model.
The Estimation Strategy
The structure of the the model suggests implementation of the estimation procedure in two steps. This two-step approach is attractive because the implications of the model regarding locational equilibrium can be studied separately from implications regarding determination of public good levels. In the rst step, quantiles of the income distributions predicted by the model are matched with empirical counterparts observed in the data. This allows us to identify and estimate a subset of the parameters of interest. The basic idea of the second stage is to exploit the condition which c haracterizes the locus of pivotal voters. If the model is correctly speci ed, the implied levels of public expenditures can be explained by their observed counterparts. The second step completes the estimation procedures and allows us to recover almost all structural parameters of the underlying model. We will brie y describe the rst step of the estimation procedure implemented in Epple and Sieg 1999, and focus more fully on the the second stage. 16 Given a parametric assumption on the joint distribution of income and tastes for the population of the metropolitan area and the indirect utility function of the households, the model determines a joint distribution of income and taste parameters for every community.
The estimation strategy is based on the idea that the di erence between the empirical quantiles of the income distributions observed in the data and the quantiles predicted by the model should be small, if the model is evaluated at the true parameter values. More formally, the di erence between the empirical and the predicted quantiles should converge almost surely to zero as the sample size increases for each community and quantile. Equation
3
.12 implies that quantiles of the income distribution of community j depend on g j ; p j only through the community speci c intercepts K j . We can treat the K j 's as unknown parameters and estimate the model using a Minimum Distance Estimator. The parameters that are identi ed in this step include the parameters of underlying distribution of income, the correlation between income and tastes, the income elasticity of housing and the ratio of to the standard deviation of the taste for public goods. 17
The estimation strategy described so far has ignored information about community 16 Note that this approach is similar in spirit to work in the di erentiated products literature by Berry 1994 and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995 although the actual implementation di ers signi cantly.
17
First step estimation can be simpli ed using simulation techniques. For a discussion of simulation in estimation see among others Pakes and Pollard 1989 , McFadden 1989 and Gourieroux and Monfort 1993 populations. This is a drawback f o r a n umber of reasons. First, there is fairly accurate information on community populations. Therefore one would like to incorporate this information in the estimation procedure. Broadly speaking, adding more information to the estimation procedure should improve the estimation results. Second, the populations of the communities vary substantially within a metropolitan area. A failure to explain the correct population of each community w ould lessen the credibility of the framework. Incorporating information about community populations into the estimation procedure is easier than one might expect. Equation 3.14 can be solved recursively to obtain the community speci c intercepts, K j , as a function of the parameters of the bivariate distribution of income and tastes, y ; ; ; y ; , the parameters ; and the community sizes, PC 1 ; :::; PC J . One can impose these community size restrictions in the estimation procedure. We then estimate the parameters of the model by matching the quantiles of the income distributions subject to the constraint that community speci c intercepts are chosen to replicate observed community sizes. 18 If we h a v e data on housing prices, tax rates, public expenditures and local amenities for the sample of communities, we can identify and estimate the remaining structural parameters of the model. The biggest problem encountered in the empirical implementation of the model is that local public good provision is multidimensional and partially unobserved by the econometrician. Following the empirical literature on di erentiated products in in- 18 An appendix which discusses identi cation and estimation of the parameters of the model more formally is available upon request from the authors. dustrial organization, we assume that the level of public good provision can be expressed as an index which consists of observed characteristics of community j denoted x j and an unobserved characteristic denoted j : g j = x 0 j + j 4.1 where is a parameter vector to be estimated. j is observed by the households, but unobserved by the econometrician.
In this application, we assume that the rst component of the index, x 1j , is given by expenditures for education per capita which i s c hosen by majority rule. All other observed components, x 2j ; :::; x kj of the index are determined exogenously. Since the index has an arbitrary unit of measurement, we can set 1 = 1 which implies that the index is measured in educational expenditures per capita. Furthermore the derivative of the index with respect to educational expenditures is equal to one. In the previous section, we h a v e seen, that the myopic voting model implies that the slope of GPF of community j is only a function of the marginal costs of public goods and the per capita housing stock. Since we measure public goods by expenditures per capita, we set c 0 g = 1. This suggests the following linear approximation of the inverse of equation 3.27: dp j dg j geneity among households, observed and unobserved characteristics of communities, the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures as well as the self-selection of households into communities of their choice.
Finally, w e w ould like to point out that this estimation procedure generalizes to the case where voters are more sophisticated as assumed in the utility taking hypothesis. Computational requirements increase, however, drastically for at least two reasons. First, the slope of the GPF is more complicated to compute. Second, and more importantly, the slope of the GPF in a community n o w depends on the levels of public good provision in adjacent communities. Consequently, w e can no longer solve for g j equation by equation, but need to solve the system of equations in 4:2 simultaneously. 22 While this estimator is still feasible, it is much more demanding from a programming and computational perspective.
Empirical Results
In the rst stage of the estimation procedure, we match select quantiles of the empirical income distributions of the communities with their predicted counterparts. This part of the estimation procedure is identical to the one in Epple and Sieg 1999 and hence we obtain the same results which are summarized in This problem is equivalent to solving a system of nonlinear equations and similar to the share inversion problem encountered in Berry 1994. con dence levels, however, the di erence between the predicted and estimated quantiles of the income distributions is reasonably small for most communities.
Based on these rst stage results, we can estimate the intercept, L j , for each community using 3.19. The intercept and the slope parameters, and , c haracterize the locus of the pivotal voters within a community. Our model implies that this intercept is a function of the housing price and the level of public good provision equation 3.18. The basic idea of the second stage of the estimation procedure is to invert the functional relationship which maps the levels of public good provision, g j , i n to the community i n tercept, L j . I n v erting this mapping yields values for the index of public good provision which are consistent with our model speci cation equation4.4. The estimator chooses the parameter vector to minimize the distance between these values and an index of observed expenditures and amenities.
As explained above, we can estimate the remaining structural parameters of the model using either a nonlinear least squares estimator, which ignores the potential correlations between housing prices, expenditure levels and crime rates with the error term, or a GMM estimator, which uses the income rank and exogenous amenities as instruments. Column I of Table 2 reports the estimated parameters obtained using NLLS while columns II and III shows the results from two di erent GMM estimators. The rst one uses functions of income rank and crime as instruments. The second one only uses functions of income rank since crime rates may also be endogenous. Column IV adds orthogonality conditions derived from the locational equilibrium. For comparison, we also report in column V previous results which are based on orthogonality conditions derived only from the locational equilibrium. 23 The rst three columns report the most important ndings of this study. The di erences between the estimated parameters of the three columns are small. Correcting for the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures primarily a ects the point estimates for ln and . The point estimate for rates which measures the trade-o between schooling expenditures and crime is -2.39 -2.99, -2.62 with an estimated standard error of approximately 1.8 1.4, 3.5. This indicates that households perceive the protection from crime as a public good and are willing to trade o higher crime levels with higher levels of education expenditures.
If we only exploit orthogonality conditions derived from the voting equilibrium ln is 23 See Epple and Sieg 1999 for a formal derivation of the orthogonality conditions which can be derived from the boundary indi erence condition. The procedure involves recursively solving equation 3.12 for gj+1 proceeding from the lowest to the highest ranked community. Then the gj are replaced by the index in 4.1 and the resulting expressions are solved for the j's. These conditions are also exploited by the estimators in columns IV and V. not separately identi ed from the 1 and 2 . W e therefore set ln = ,2:5 in the estimation procedure. This is a reasonable estimate based on the previous ndings reported in Epple and Sieg 1999. The estimates for ln are 0.3 0.52, 0.48 with a standard error of approximately 0.15 0.18, 0.14. These estimates suggest that there is a signi cant amount of unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for public goods which provides an explanation for the fact that income varies quite substantially within communities. The point estimate for is -0.09 -0.15, -0.14.
We can compute price and income elasticities for local public goods based on the parameter estimates of the substitution elasticity, , and the income elasticity of housing, , a s w ell as the observed income and expenditure levels. 24 This approach di ers from previous 24 Formulas for computing these elasticities are available from the authors. studies, because the elasticities are functions of the structural parameters of the indirect utility function evaluated at observed income and expenditure levels instead of constant parameters of a log-linear demand system. Hence one should be careful when comparing the point estimates reported in this study with those found in previous studies. We nd that the estimated price elasticity is -0.92. The income elasticity is approximately 0.52. Our results, therefore, suggest that the demand for local public good may be more price-elastic than previously believed. The estimate of the income elasticity is of a similar magnitude as the ones reported in previous studies. 25 The point estimates of 1 and 2 indicate that the derivative of housing prices with respect to public good provisions is almost constant across communities. The derivatives do not signi cantly depend on the magnitude of the tax base measured by the housing stock. These results do not lend support for the simple myopic voting model. 26 We reject the null hypothesis that 2 = 1 at any reasonable levels of con dence.
One of the most interesting ndings of this study is that the estimation results obtained from orthogonality conditions which exploit the voting equilibrium are in fact quite similar to the one we found previously based on the locational equilibrium. Comparing the results in columns I, II and III with the ones reported in column V we nd that point estimates and the estimated standard errors of the structural parameters are not very di erent. We i n v estigate this relationship more carefully and estimate the parameters by imposing both sets of orthogonality conditions. The results are displayed in column IV of Table 3 .
The point estimate for is -1.75 which slightly lower than the ones reported in columns I through III. The estimate of ln falls between those reported in I and V. The point estimate for ln is slightly lower than the one reported in V. However, the di erences are well within one standard deviation. This indicates that the di erences are not statistically signi cant. We therefore conclude that imposing both sets of orthogonality conditions does not alter the parameter estimates signi cantly.
We also nd that the levels of public good provisions implied by the loci of the pivotal voters are almost identical to the ones implied by the boundary indi erence condition. This result is illustrated in Figure 3 . We plot the levels of public good provision as predicted by the loci of the decisive v oters, the boundary indi erence conditions and the index. We nd that the di erences between the rst two lines are negligible for almost all communities in the sample. The predicted value for the linear index shows more idiosyncratic movements which the the model attributes to the unobserved characteristics of the communities. We conclude that observed allocations are compatible with restrictions implied by boundary indi erence and majority rule.
Conclusions
In this paper, we focus on the collective c hoice mechanism typically imposed in models of residential choice in a system of local jurisdictions. The estimator of the underlying structural parameters of the model is based on necessary conditions that allocations must satisfy in equilibrium under majority rule. One of the main contributions of this paper is to show that it is in fact possible to consistently estimate the underlying parameters of a fairly general equilibrium model based on orthogonality conditions derived from majority rule. Our estimator is, as far as we know, the only feasible approach a v ailable. The ndings of this paper provide some support for our modeling and estimation strategy, especially in light of the tight parameterization of the model. The estimates of the structural parameters have the expected signs and are in most cases of reasonable magnitudes. The estimated elasticities indicate that the demand for local public goods is responsive to both price and income changes. The parameter estimates characterizing the demand for housing are also quite reasonable which lends additional support to our empirical approach. This paper highlights the importance that voters' perceptions of trade-o s between local expenditures and taxes play in the analysis of majority rule within a system of local jurisdictions. We h a v e shown how to compute these slopes under a number of di erent scenarios about voter sophistication. Unfortunately, only the most simple speci cations yield tractable closed-form solutions of this derivative. In the empirical analysis we therefore follow an approach which tries to approximate the slopes of the GPF's by a exible functional speci cation which contains the simple myopic model as a special case. The speci cation of the model, which ts the data the best and produces the most plausible parameter estimates, has the property that the slopes of the GPF's do not di er much across communities. The simple myopic voting model seems to impose too much v ariation in these derivatives. This nding, if it should be con rmed by other studies, raises a number of interesting questions about how t o m o d e l v oting behavior in these type of economies.
While our empirical approach provides reasonable estimates of the underlying structural parameters of the model, it is subject to a number of limitations. First, it relies on a number of strong assumptions about household preferences, mobility, the cost of providing public goods and the perceived slopes of the government-services possibility frontiers. However, it should be pointed out that most assumptions imposed in this paper are quite common in theoretical work and computational general equilibrium analysis. Nevertheless, future research should allow for more sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households. Second, our research is subject to data limitations. In particular, better data on housing prices and public good provisions would provide a more precise test of the hypotheses of interest. We believe that the approach outlined in this paper raises a number of interesting issues and provides ample scope for future research to improve our understanding of the underlying sorting processes as well as the determination of local public policies.
